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INTRODUCTION
Incarceration incapacitates only very incompletely. This
observation is not new. 1 It is, however, worthy of further
emphasis and discussion because any contrary statement
discounts prison crime and excludes inmates from the
relevant measuring population (“society”). To arrive at this
conclusion, this essay first constructs a definition of
incapacitation that recognizes two distinct types of
incapacitation: offense-specific incapacitation and victimspecific incapacitation. The former concerns limitations on
the offender’s range of conduct while the latter focuses on
limitations on the offender’s access to particular populations. 2
Next, the essay applies this framework to incarceration and
determines that this mode of punishment achieves both types
* Associate Teaching Fellow and Assistant Professor of Professional
Practice, Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center. Many thanks
to Ken Levy for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay as well
as to Graham Polando for his thoughtful suggestions.
1. See infra note 46.
2. See infra Part I.
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of incapacitation only to a partial degree. 3
However,
incarceration’s incapacitative benefits are often overstated by
excluding inmates from the world of persons worthy of
protection. 4 Such descriptions improperly imply a diminished
interest in protecting inmates and should be avoided. 5
I. THE RESTRAINT OF MISCHIEF
Incapacitation is the removal of an offender’s ability to
commit future crime against a relevant population. 6 It has
long ago secured itself in the pantheon of generally accepted
purposes of punishment 7 alongside general and specific
deterrence, 8 retributivist notions of just deserts, 9 and the
elusive ideal of rehabilitation. 10 Despite the importance of
incapacitation theory in modern sentencing schemes, it has
received comparatively little scholarly attention relative to
the other, “more sophisticated,” purposes of punishment. 11 By
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. More generally, incapacitation is defined as “[t]he action of disabling or
depriving of legal capacity” or “[t]he state of being disabled or lacking legal
capacity.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed. 2009).
7. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a) (1962) (listing crime
prevention as a purpose of punishment); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 cmt. 3(a)
(1985) (explaining that crime prevention encompasses “incapacitating persons
who are dangerously disposed to engage in criminal conduct”); 1 JEREMY
BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365,
396 (1843) (“If the crime he has committed is of a kind calculated to inspire
great alarm, as manifesting a very mischievous disposition, it becomes
necessary to take from him the power of committing it again.”).
8. See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 2.2 (2d ed. 1991)
(“Special deterrence defends criminal penalties as a way to disincline individual
offenders from repeating the same or other criminal acts.”). Specific, or
“special,” deterrence differs from general deterrence in that general deterrence
is concerned with the future actions of the public at large rather than those of
the punished individual. See id.
9. “To the retributivist, punishment of a wrongdoer is justified because he
deserves to be punished. . . . Unlike utilitarianism, retributivism is premised on
the view that punishment of wrongdoers is morally right whether or not it
provides any future social gain.”
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 6 (1st ed. 1987), quoted in CAMPBELL, supra note 8, § 2.5.
10. The rehabilitative model “use[s] the correctional system to reform the
wrongdoer rather than to secure compliance through the fear or ‘bad taste’ of
punishment. The methods of reformation will vary from case to case, but could
consist of, for example, psychiatric care, therapy for drug addiction, or academic
or vocational training.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 15
(6th ed. 2012).
11. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
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and large, the current incapacitation literature focuses on
quantitative analyses of how well incarceration achieves the
larger goal of crime reduction. 12 These studies require
complex predictions involving the substitution effects of other
offenders filling the crime void created by imprisoning the
incarcerated offender. 13 The baser, but more often bypassed,
question that remains is whether, how, and to what extent
imprisonment incapacitates the incarcerated offender herself.
A punishment achieves incapacitation when it strips a
person of the power to commit future crimes regardless of her
will to do so. Because incapacitation focuses on a person’s
ability rather than on her will, a punishment generally
requires a physical component to incapacitate: “body
operating upon body is sufficient to the task.” 14
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 157 (1995) (“The reliance of
incapacitation on the physical control of offenders renders it a low-technology
criminal sanction . . . .”); 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon Versus New South
Wales: Or, the Panopticon Penitentiary System, and the Penal Colonization
System, Compared, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 7, at 184–
86 (discussing the punishment of incapacitation (“it may be aimed at almost
without thought”) versus rehabilitation (“a very complex object: thought and
contrivance are necessary to the pursuit of it”)); see also Andrew D. Leipold,
Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS.
L.J. 536, 542 (2006) (“As a rationale for current practice, incapacitation . . . has
the virtue of avoiding many of the contentious questions that surround other
punishment rationales. We need not wrestle with difficult questions of whether
higher punishments deter, either specifically or collectively; nor do we need a
consensus on whether it is morally appropriate or repellent to give voice to
retributive instincts in doling out punishment. We can hope that prisoners are
rehabilitated (as most people do), but as long as they are in prison, we worry far
less about the downsides of the failures of rehabilitative efforts.” (footnote
omitted)).
12. See, e.g., WILLIAM SPELMAN, CRIMINAL INCAPACITATION (1994);
STEPHEN VAN DINE, JOHN P. CONRAD & SIMON DINITZ, RESTRAINING THE
WICKED: THE INCAPACITATION OF THE DANGEROUS CRIMINAL (1979); ZIMRING &
HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 79–127; Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do
Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal
Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103 (1998); Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison
Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation,
111 Q.J. ECON. 319 (1996); Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less Crime?
Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON.
551, 551 (2009); Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L.
REV. 1049, 1108 (2008) (concluding that imprisonment may actually cause more
crime than it prevents); Ben Vollaard, Preventing Crime Through Selective
Incapacitation, 123 ECON. J. 262 (2013).
13. See, e.g., ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 55–56 (theorizing that
substitution is more likely for offenses that involve a market for illicit goods and
services, such as drug distribution and prostitution).
14. BENTHAM, supra note 11, at 186. In some instances, non-physical
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Incapacitation’s focus on the ability of an offender creates an
important conceptual distinction between incapacitation and
deterrence. A punishment achieves specific deterrence when
it alters the will of the person being punished so that the
person elects to forgo future crime. 15 No physical component
is necessary to alter a person’s will—the threat of punishment
may be sufficient. The potential of receiving a speeding ticket
deters many people from speeding, even though it does not
incapacitate them from doing so. Increased likelihood of
detection—like monitoring a probationer with an ankle
bracelet—may also deter future wrongdoing without actually
incapacitating the individual. 16
Thus, to design a punishment that incapacitates, a
governing authority must first identify the offense or offenses
it wishes to inhibit as well as the relevant population it
wishes to protect. Once these two variables are identified, the
governing authority must determine what the offender needs
in order to commit the identified offenses against the relevant
population and deny the offender access to those resources.
The same calculus can be applied—albeit backwardly—to
existing punishments to measure their incapacitative
achievements and shortcomings. Just as some punishments
partially rehabilitate, partially deter, or partially serve up a
just desert, most punishments only partially incapacitate. A
punishment’s incapacitative achievements can be measured
with regard to both offense-specific incapacitation as well as
victim-specific incapacitation.
The former focuses on
limitations on the offender’s range of conduct. The latter
focuses on limitations on the offender’s access to particular
populations.
With regard to either type of incapacitation, a
punishment’s effectiveness may be measured along a sliding
scale with “negligible inhibition” on one end and “absolute
denial of capacity” on the other.
Of course, a single
punishments such as fines or shaming carry some crime-inhibiting effects. See
infra notes 23–26 and accompanying text.
15. Owens, supra note 12, at 552 (“A deterred offender is able to commit
crime but chooses not to, whereas an incapacitated offender would choose to
commit crime but is unable to do so.”).
16. Extremely close monitoring that could actually physically intervene
should the offender attempt to commit an offense, such as the constant presence
of a band of officers alongside a probationer, could rise to the level of
incapacitation.
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punishment may partially incapacitate an offender with
respect to both categories, but it is the rare punishment that
fully achieves both. Only death absolutely incapacitates an
offender from committing all future offenses against all
potential victims. 17 For all other punishments, incapacitation
is a matter of degree along both spectrums. 18
A. Offense-Specific Incapacitation
The degree of offense-specific incapacitation is dictated
by two variables: (1) the range of offense conduct that is
inhibited by the punishment, and (2) the level of difficulty
with which the offender can circumvent the barrier to reoffending. A punishment may be designed to inhibit an
offender’s ability to commit crime in general or may be
specifically tailored to impede the offender from committing a
specific category of offenses. Either way, most non-capital
barriers to reoffending may be overcome by a particularly
strong or cunning offender.
Consider the often specifically targeted effects of
punishments that involve physically mutilating the offender.
Surgical castration of a sex offender inhibits the offender’s
ability to engage in only a relatively narrow category of
offenses, but is highly effective at inhibiting those offenses. 19
In comparison, cutting off a thief’s hands inhibits the offender
from committing the entire range of offenses that are made
easier by having hands, but likely does not achieve absolute
incapacitation with regard to any offense, including stealing.
Other punishments, such as death and imprisonment,
are less targeted toward the incapacitation of specific offenses
than the offender’s ability to commit crime in general. Death,
of course, impedes the offender from committing any and all
future offense. As described later, imprisonment achieves
varying levels of offense-specific incapacitation by impairing
the offender’s access to the various resources necessary to

17. See JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 58 (1975);
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 48 (1968).
18. PACKER, supra note 17, at 48.
19. See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical
Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS. L.J. 559, 577–78 (2006) (describing castration’s incapacitative effects);
see also Steven S. Kan, Corporal Punishments and Incapacitation, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 121, 124–26 (1996).
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commit certain crimes. 20
Whether targeted at certain offenses or criminal activity
in general, a punishment only incapacitates to the extent that
the offender is unable to overcome the restriction placed upon
her. Death is impossible to overcome. Mutilation may be
overcome with prosthesis. Effective confinement is limited by
the barriers to escape.
Most non-physical restraints fail to incapacitate. 21 The
subject of a restraining order may elect to abide by the
restriction for fear of the punishment attendant to violating
the order, but such a choice is a product of the deterrent effect
of the potential punishment, not of any actual incapacitation.
Similarly, taking away a drunk driver’s operating license
carries no incapacitative benefits because it does not actually
impede the offender from committing any future offense,
including drunk driving. 22 Physically impeding the offender’s
ability to drive drunk by installing a breathalyzer lock in her
vehicle, on the other hand, does inhibit the offender from
future drunk driving, albeit only to a minor extent because
the offender retains the capacity to drive other vehicles while
intoxicated or circumvent the breathalyzer lock with the
assistance of a sober person.
Nonetheless, some non-physical punishments carry
incapacitative effects in certain circumstances. One study
found that fines were more effective than incarceration at
reducing the incidence of public drunkenness among the very
poor, presumably because the fines drained funds that would
otherwise be spent on alcohol. 23 Thus, a fine that is large

20. See infra Part I.B.
21. A restraint need not be a “punishment” in the criminal sense to carry
incapacitative benefits.
Many protective actions may be considered
incapacitative shields. Placing a locking mechanism on a vehicle’s steering
wheel—or simply locking the doors of an unattended vehicle—makes theft of
that vehicle more difficult. Likewise, armoring a vehicle with bullet-proof glass
makes assassination of the inhabitants of the vehicle more challenging. See
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 156 (discussing “environmental
adjustments” as a strategy of crime prevention).
22. See id. at 160.
23. See Keith Lovald & Holger R. Stub, The Revolving Door: Reactions of
Chronic Drunkenness Offenders to Court Sanctions, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 525, 529 (1968) (finding that fines were more effective than
incarceration at increasing the time between court appearances on charges of
public drunkenness among the generally impoverished residents of
Minneapolis’s “Skid Row”).
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relative to the financial resources of an offender partially
incapacitates the offender from committing future offenses
that would be made easier by having money. 24 The poor lack
the ability to commit some offenses—especially the purchase
of expensive illicit items—simply because they lack material
resources. Therefore, a fine that impoverishes the offender
will impede the offender from committing certain future
offenses.
On the other end of the spectrum, researchers have
linked shaming to incapacitation of white-collar offenders
because future would-be victims will avoid engaging in
financial transactions with known criminals. 25 However, bad
publicity is less likely to incapacitate the super-rich because
they are more able to use their considerable means to seek
out potential victims in fresh social circles. 26 Thus, while
non-physical punishments like fines and shaming may carry
some incapacitative effects, these effects are highly offensespecific and are likely more than negligible only when applied
against the “right” offender.
Incapacitative punishments—or, indeed, restraints of any
kind—are rarely so well designed so as to incapacitate only
the targeted activity. Rather, a restraint of an offender’s
ability to commit further illegal activity will invariably lead
to collateral incapacitation that inhibits the offender’s ability
to engage in legal, potentially beneficial activity as well. The
handless thief will find it challenging to engage in a variety of
constructive undertakings.
The offender impoverished
through a fine is unable to invest in a small business or

24. Although wealth may also enhance an offender’s ability to escape
apprehension or conviction, that aspect is one of deterrence rather than
incapacitation.
25. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:
A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON.
365, 370–71 (1999) (arguing that publicized shaming effectively incapacitates a
white-collar criminal because others avoid dealing with the offender and “[i]t is
as though he walks around surrounded by bars”); Toni M. Massaro, Shame,
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1899–1900 (1991)
(arguing that incapacitation theory supports shaming sanctions because other
members of society may avoid contact with known offenders).
26. See Michael Levi, Suite Justice or Sweet Charity? Some Explorations of
Shaming and Incapacitating Business Fraudsters, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 147,
158–59 (2002) (concluding that white-collar offenders “with limited social and
geographic mobility” are most susceptible to shaming but that the punishment
is less effective against the super-rich, especially in a “mobile, global culture”).
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donate money toward charitable purposes. The executed
criminal is unable to contribute to society at all. At some
point, the disutility associated with the collateral
incapacitation of valuable activity outweighs the utility
conferred by the incapacitation of harmful activity and makes
punishment irrational from a utilitarian perspective. 27
In summary, a punishment’s effectiveness at achieving
offense-specific incapacitation depends on the degree to which
the punishment inhibits the offender from committing future
offenses—measured by the range of future offenses inhibited,
the extent to which the punishment restricts the commission
of those future offenses, and the ease with which the offender
can overcome the barrier to reoffending.
B. Victim-Specific Incapacitation
Incapacitation can also be measured by the degree to
which a punishment alters the population of potential
victims. Some punishments inhibit an offender’s ability to
victimize a particular population without interfering with the
offender’s ability to commit any particular offense. The
measuring population may be as specific as a single
individual or “preferred victim.” To achieve victim-specific
incapacitation, a punishment must separate the offender from
the relevant population or impose some sort of barrier
between the offender and the relevant population of potential
victims.
A classic example of victim-specific incapacitation is the
punishment variously known as exile, transportation, or
deportation. Exile physically removes an offender from a
particular jurisdiction; thus, it limits the offender’s ability to
commit future crimes in that jurisdiction. On its own,
however, exile imposes no incapacitative restraints on the
offender in the land of banishment. By only relocating the
mischief-maker, exile simply exchanges one population of
potential victims for another. 28 Thus, the incapacitative
27. Weighing collateral incapacitation against crime prevention could lead
to the reluctance to punish “productive” members of society.
Such
determinations, however, are well beyond the purview of this essay, which is
aimed at measuring the nuts and bolts of incapacitation in practice rather than
its theoretical underpinnings.
28. To the extent that exile separates the offender from a preferred victim,
it inhibits the offender’s ability to victimize the preferred victim. But, on the
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“success” of exile is jurisdictionally-dependent. If the justice
system measures success only with regard to the sentencing
jurisdiction, then exile may be quite an effective means of
incapacitation. 29 But if incapacitative success is measured on
a global scale, then exile is a decidedly ineffective
punishment.
Offense-specific incapacitation is always a rational goal of
punishment because it reduces the offender’s ability to
commit crime. However, victim-specific incapacitation is not
always rational because it may simply trade one population of
potential victims for another. 30 Victim-specific incapacitation
is only a rational goal of punishment to the extent that the
sentencing entity (1) prefers the victimization of one
population over another or (2) knows that the offender is
more likely to victimize one population relative to another.
To illustrate, the victimization of the inhabitants of
Australia was unimportant to the British sentencing
authority at the close of the eighteenth century. 31 Thus, exile
of British offenders to New South Wales was a rational
punishment. Likewise, if a sex offender is known to be more
likely to victimize females than males, it is rational to
segregate the sex offender from females because such
segregation will likely decrease the offender’s rate of
offending. But assuming that the federal government has no
preference with regard to the victimization of Kansans or
converse, it also exposes the offender to an entire population of potential victims
that may have previously been beyond her reach.
29. But note that exile’s incapacitative effects are only offense-specific:
although exile may impose a formidable barrier against an offender assaulting
an inhabitant of the sentencing jurisdiction, it imposes a markedly less
formidable barrier against committing other offenses against the inhabitants of
the sentencing jurisdiction that do not require physical presence in the
jurisdiction.
30. If a punishment were to inhibit an offender’s ability to victimize all
people, the punishment would achieve both offense-specific incapacitation as
well as victim-specific incapacitation. For example, banishing an offender to an
uninhabited desert island creates offense-specific incapacitation because it
impedes the offender’s ability to commit a whole host of offenses at all rather
than merely inhibiting the offender’s ability to engage in victim selection or
access a particular population.
31. BENTHAM, supra note 11, at 183 (noting that the exile of British
offenders to New South Wales “render[ed] it impossible for a man to do any
more such mischief in the only spot in the world worth thinking about. . . .
[H]ow the people thus sent thither behaved while there, was a point which, so
long as they did but stay there, or, at any rate, did not come back here, was not
worth thinking about.”).
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Nebraskans and offenders would victimize the inhabitants of
either state at the same rate, it would be irrational for the
federal government to exile offenders from one state to
another as part of a scheme of victim-specific incapacitation.
Like
offense-specific
incapacitation,
the
second
component of victim-specific incapacitation is the
effectiveness of the barrier that separates the offender from
the relevant measuring population. Exile’s effectiveness at
impeding an offender from physically harming an inhabitant
of the sentencing jurisdiction is largely dependent on how
difficult it will be for the offender to re-enter the sentencing
jurisdiction. Kansas state authorities may favor the exile of
offenders to Nebraska, but the ease with which offenders can
cross back over the state line greatly decreases the
effectiveness of protecting Kansas citizens by transporting
offenders from Topeka to Omaha. In the late eighteen
century, the prospect of an offender making his way back to
England from Australia was unlikely. 32 But the ease of
modern global transportation has greatly reduced the
effectiveness of exile at producing a high degree of victimspecific incapacitation, although tighter international border
security has perhaps counterbalanced this reduction to some
degree. 33
Mere physical distance between an offender and a wouldbe victim no longer impedes all offenses. In modern times, a
person with an Internet connection in Australia can work all
manner of mischief on residents of the United Kingdom. But
the intervening distance reduces the types of offenses the
offender can commit against the relevant population (here,
Britons)—assault or burglary would be difficult, for example.
This example illustrates the intersection of offense-specific
and victim-specific incapacitation—potential offenses against
Australians are disregarded by the sentencing authority (a
function of victim-specific incapacitation), but the
punishment selected fails to totally impede all offenses
against the relevant population and therefore reveals a lack
of total offense-specific incapacitation.
32. Id. at 186 (“The moon was then, as it continues to be, inaccessible: upon
earth there was no accessible spot more distant than New South Wales.”).
33. See Pritikin, supra note 12, at 1099 n.245 (declaring that exile is “no
longer a viable option” given the “political subdivision of most inhabitable lands,
as well as advances in communications and transportation technology”).
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II. INCARCERATION’S INCAPACITATIVE SHORTCOMINGS
After the fall of widespread notions of the rehabilitative
benefits of imprisonment, 34 incapacitation may now well be
However, this
the primary purpose of incarceration. 35
“central technique of punishment” 36 only partially
incapacitates. 37 Proper framing of this partial incapacitation
sheds light on the benefits and shortcomings of imprisonment
as a punishment. It is unfortunate then, that all too often
imprisonment is trotted out as a poster child for something
that it is not—absolute incapacitation. 38 Suggesting that
inmates lose all ability to commit crime for the duration of a
prison sentence is simply outlandish and, as explained below,
carries with it dangerous implications for how the justice
system should view prison crime. It is therefore important to
be mindful of incarceration’s incapacitative shortcomings lest
prison crime is discounted to zero and inmates are
marginalized by exclusion from the relevant measuring
population of “society” worthy of protection by the criminal
law.
A. Imprisonment’s Partial Offense-Specific Incapacitation
Imprisonment reduces inmates’ ability to commit certain
offenses, but falls well short of achieving total incapacitation
of all offense conduct.
To recap, offense-specific
incapacitation depends upon the amount of offense conduct
that the punishment inhibits, and the amount of difficulty
with which the offender can circumvent the barrier to reoffending. As discussed below, imprisonment impedes a fair
amount of illegal conduct and generally places a relatively
formidable barrier to escape.
34. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(b) (2d ed.
2003) (chronicling criticism of rehabilitation as a justification for
imprisonment); CAMPBELL, supra note 8, § 2.4 (same).
35. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001); ZIMRING &
HAWKINS, supra note 11, at v, 14–15, 72.
36. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 11, at 158.
37. Incarceration comes in many forms. The severity of the restrictions
imposed upon prisoners largely dictates the incapacitative success of
incarceration.
Solitary confinement in a secure facility unquestionably
incapacitates more completely than imprisonment among a general prison
population. See PACKER, supra note 17, at 48. For purposes of this essay,
incarceration and imprisonment generally refer to general prison populations.
38. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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Incarceration in a general prison population totally
removes inmates’ capacity to commit some offenses (like
traffic infractions), partially impedes inmates’ ability to
commit other offenses (like drug use), and imposes no barrier
to inmates’ ability to commit other offenses (like assault).
The level of difficulty an inmate has in accessing the
resources necessary to commit the offense dictates the degree
of incapacitation (in the above examples: a vehicle, a
controlled substance, another person). For some offenses, the
barrier to re-offending is high—a prisoner will likely need to
escape the prison in order to commit a traffic infraction. For
other offenses, the barrier to re-offending is relatively low—
an inmate may need to exert an extra measure of caution in
procuring narcotics, but by no means is wholly incapacitated
from doing so.
Imprisonment confers the ability to commit some prisonspecific offenses. Certain acts that are legal in the outside
world—like tattooing—may be criminalized or penalized in
the prison environment. 39 The offense of escape is a prime
example: a non-incarcerated person cannot commit this
offense. Thus, the punishment of imprisonment enables the
commission of an offense that the inmate was previously
unable to commit. 40
On the whole, incarceration has significant incapacitative
effects for a number of offenses. But because escape is always
possible, it fails to totally incapacitate inmates from
committing any offenses. And it enables the commission of
certain offenses and has no incapacitative effect on others.
Thus, imprisonment falls well short of achieving total
incapacitation of all offense conduct.
B. Imprisonment’s Partial Victim-Specific Incapacitation
On the victim-specific incapacitation front, imprisonment
is conceptually similar to exile. The punishment redefines
the population to which an offender has access: it trades the
39. Cf. Clifford Krauss, A Prison Makes the Illicit and Dangerous Legal and
Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005, at A4 (describing a pilot program for legal
tattooing instituted in select Canadian federal prisons).
40. The same is true of any partially incapacitative punishment that does
not truly remove the offender’s ability to overcome the restraint, but outlaws
the offender from doing so (e.g., deportation confers the ability to commit the
offense of illegal re-entry).
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population outside the prison walls for the population within.
This trade erects a stiff barrier for offenders with a single
preferred victim—an inmate who desires to assault his exwife will find it difficult to do so. Although incarceration
causes a net loss of access to potential victims because the
population inside the prison is undoubtedly smaller than the
population outside of the prison, the world of likely future
victims merely shifts away from non-incarcerated persons to
inmates and correctional personnel. 41
Highly restrictive forms of imprisonment, such as
solitary confinement, have much greater incapacitative
effects than confinement in a general prison population. 42
This incapacitative benefit is largely a product of reducing the
population to which the inmate has access. Like exile on a
deserted island, solitary confinement sharply diminishes an
inmate’s range of offenses because she lacks ready access to
victims.
Returning to inmates confined in a general prison
population, the victim-specific incapacitation attendant to
imprisonment may be either a neutral byproduct of the
punishment or a purposeful feature of the punishment. Key
to that determination is whether the governing authority
includes other prisoners in the relevant measuring population
worthy of protection. If so, then imprisonment’s victimspecific incapacitation is neutrally viewed by the governing
authority: the inmate is surrounded by a different set of
potential victims (other inmates rather than members of the
“outside world”), but the governing authority does not prefer
the victimization of either group. If not, and the governing
authority prefers the victimization of inmates to residents of
the “outside world,” then the governing authority should view
the victim-specific incapacitation positively.
By expressing a lack of regard for the victimization of
other inmates, here is where numerous descriptions of the
incapacitative benefits of imprisonment go off track.
Incarceration is frequently described as achieving
incapacitation, even absolute incapacitation, by removing
41. Likewise, release from prison carries victim-specific incapacitative
effects by imposing barriers to access to inmates. Upon release from prison, an
inmate will find it virtually impossible to assault a former bunkmate who
remains locked behind the prison walls.
42. See supra note 37.
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inmates from “society.” 43 If for no other reason, claims of
absolute incapacitation fail because prisons are vulnerable to
escape, and escapees unquestionably work mischief in the
As explained above, the degree of
outside world. 44
incarceration’s victim-specific incapacitation is dependent
upon the effectiveness of the barriers to escape. If an inmate
can escape imprisonment with ease, the punishment produces
negligible victim-specific incapacitation because it creates
little impediment to accessing any population—much like
exiled offenders crossing the border back into Kansas. Most
prisons, while not easy to escape, are not impermeable. 45
Thus, claims of absolute incapacitation through incarceration
descriptively miss the mark.
The more troubling subtext presented by these
descriptions is the exclusion of people in prisons from the
relevant measuring population of “society.” 46 Here again the
43. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2053 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that sentences of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole “[b]y definition . . . serve the goal of incapacitation by
ensuring that . . . offenders . . . no longer threaten their communities”); 1
LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 1.5(a)(2) (“If the criminal is imprisoned or executed, he
cannot commit further crimes against society.”); Michele Cotton, Back with a
Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal
Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000) (“Incapacitation uses
imprisonment to remove the offender from society to protect it from the danger
he poses.”); Richard S. Frase, A More Perfect System: Twenty-Five Years of
Guidelines Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005) (“Incapacitation
prevents crime by imprisoning high-risk offenders, thus physically restraining
them from committing further crimes against the public.”); James S. Gwin,
Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 176 (2010)
(“Incapacitation separates a defendant from society and physically prevents
further crime.”); Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence
Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 343, 347 (1999) (“While incarcerated, the agent is unable to commit
further crimes.”); Ledger Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 630, 639 (1938) (discussing imprisonment: “It is one of
the primary functions of organized society to protect itself against the criminal
elements within it and this can ordinarily be accomplished only by completely
isolating them.”). This list could be expanded significantly; the cited works are
merely illustrative.
44. See, e.g., Bob Ortega, 2 Plead Guilty in Fatal Prison Escape, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Jan. 21, 2012, at B2.
45. See, e.g., id.
46. See Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 110
n.154 (2010) (noting that the general failure to factor prison crimes into
analyses of whether utilitarian rationales justify punishment is a weakness of
such justifications); Leipold, supra note 11, at 556 (“Inmate-on-inmate crime
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exile analogy is useful. Imprisonment exiles inmates from
the “outside world” to the “prison world.” By measuring the
incapacitative effects of imprisonment by how well it protects
those in the “outside world,” these descriptions ascribe no
negative value to offenses committed in the “prison world.” 47
If offenses committed in the prison world are ignored, then
imprisonment achieves a high level of incapacitation by
safeguarding the relevant population (here, the outside
world). 48
But such is not the case. The governing authority should
and does have an interest in crimes committed in the prison
world. Solid evidence of this interest exists in the form of the
criminalization of offenses committed against fellow
inmates. 49 If the governing authority truly had no interest in
what occurred in the prison world—like Britain’s lack of
concern for what went on in New South Wales—then it would
not criminalize and prosecute conduct that occurred there.
Even so-called ‘victimless crimes’ such as drug use remain
illegal in prison. 50 Such criminalization demonstrates that
may be largely invisible to the larger world, but that is no excuse for ignoring
crimes committed while in prison in our [crime-reduction] calculations.”
(footnote omitted)); Catherine M. Sharkey, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Is Blind
Faith in Incapacitation Justified?, 105 YALE L.J. 1433, 1433 n.3 (1996)
(reviewing FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995)) (“Studies of the effect of
incarceration on crime rates usually ignore crime within prisons. Crimes
committed within prison walls, if explicitly acknowledged in a utilitarian
analysis of incapacitation, would reduce the calculated social benefit of crimes
averted in society.”) (citations omitted).
47. See JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 57–58 (6th ed. 2008) (suggesting that
“incapacitation” may be better termed “segregation” of offenders from society
both physically and symbolically “by implying that their welfare does not count
as part of the social welfare.”); Guyora Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 888, 895 (1988) (“We may, in other words, isolate convicted criminals in
order to convince ourselves that they are not a part of ‘society’ rather than
because we think that we thereby protect a society that includes criminals.
Imprisonment may change ‘society’ more by redefining its meaning than by
reducing its level of violence.”).
48. Inmates do retain the ability to victimize people outside of prison in
limited ways, such as by making threatening phone calls.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Delaney, 717 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2013)
(affirming first-degree murder conviction of federal inmate who strangled his
cellmate).
50. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (2012) (criminalizing the possession of
controlled substances in prison); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2P1.2 (2013) (sentencing guideline for possessing contraband in prison).
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prisons are part of “society” and inmates “count” as part of
the relevant measuring population.
But the governing authority’s interest in deterring crime
in the prison world is not in pure equilibrium with its interest
in deterring crime in the outside world. Although the federal
government has no rational preference for the victimization of
Kansans versus Nebraskans, it may have a rational
preference for the victimization of inmates versus the
victimization of those in the outside world. A rational reason
for preferring prison crime over non-prison crime is the
deterrent effect of the victimization of inmates. Publicizing
the victimization of inmates makes prison unattractive. 51
Thus, prison crime, especially violent personal offenses, may
deter some would-be criminals from offending because they
wish to avoid imprisonment. All other things being equal, a
governing authority may therefore rationally prefer an
assault of one of its inmates to an assault outside of prison.
On the other hand, prejudice against inmates should
form no part of a preference for inmate victimization over
non-inmate victimization. 52
By definition, inmates are
receiving their state-sanctioned just deserts through the
punishment of incarceration. Victimization of inmates at the
hands of other prisoners should form no part of that desert,
especially when such victimization is doled out nonproportionately to the seriousness of the inmate-victim’s
offense conduct. Indeed, it is likely that the least hardened
(and least culpable) offenders are the most likely to fall victim
to inmate-on-inmate prison crime. If anything, offenders in
the outside world who have evaded punishment are more
deserving of victimization than inmates; unlike inmates,
these individuals owe an outstanding debt to society.
In any event, a deterrence-based preference for the
victimization of inmates does not justify the conclusion that
prison crime does not “count” or that inmates are not
members of “society” worthy of protection. If the governing
51. See, e.g., Sean Fewster, Fear Frees Drug Dealer, THE ADVERTISER
(Austl.), Jan. 29, 2007, at 3 (reporting that sentencing judge found that
offender’s fear of prison would serve as an “effective deterrent” against future
crimes).
52. See KAPLAN, WEISBERG & BINDER, supra note 47, at 57 (“The prevalence
of prison violence raises the question [of] whether incapacitation theory is truly
concerned with reducing the risk of violent crime, or merely redistributing its
risk from innocents to past offenders.”).
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authority were so enamored with the deterrent effect of
inmate victimization that it found that such victimization
achieved a net positive, then it would institutionalize and
package inmate victimization as part of the punishment. The
fact that governing authorities are unwilling to go so far
demonstrates that inmate victimization is still viewed a net
negative event even if it is preferable to the victimization of a
non-inmate. Thus, when properly viewed as a negative event,
inmate victimization “counts”—and counts negatively—as an
event within the relevant measuring population known as
“society.”
Wholly excluding people inside prisons from the
measuring population implies that society lacks an interest in
protecting prisoners and correctional personnel. Lest we
totally dehumanize prisoners by discounting prison crime to
zero, this proposition fails on its face. Crimes occur in prison.
These crimes “count” because the people who commit those
crimes and their victims are part of “society.” Any statement
that fails to account for prison crime in measuring the
incapacitative effect of incarceration is both factually
inaccurate and demeaning to people in prisons.
CONCLUSION
Incapacitation must be measured in both offense-specific
and victim-specific terms. Punishments that inhibit the
commission of offenses achieve offense-specific incapacitation
to the extent that the inhibition poses a barrier to
reoffending.
Punishments that protect a particular
population from victimization achieve victim-specific
incapacitation to the extent that the punishment poses a
barrier to victimizing a particular population.
Incarceration achieves offense-specific incapacitation by
wholly or partially restricting prisoners’ ability commit
certain offenses. Incarceration also achieves victim-specific
incapacitation by redefining the population to which the
prisoner has access.
However, the victim-specific
incapacitation is only a beneficial byproduct of imprisonment
to the extent that the governing authority prefers the
victimization of inmates to the victimization of those in the
outside world. While the governing authority may rationally
possess a marginal preference for the victimization of inmates
because of the deterrent effects of deglamorizing prison life,
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the victimization of inmates remains a net negative event. As
such, descriptions of the incapacitative effects of
imprisonment that overstate its incapacitative benefits
improperly exclude inmates from the relevant measuring
population.

